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I. Introduction
Congress has empowered the Federal Communications
Commission to regulate "obscene, indecent, or profane language" in
broadcasting.' Obscenity, defined 35 years ago by the U.S. Supreme
Court as patently offensive depictions or descriptions of sexual
conduct that lack aesthetic or scientific content and appeal to a
morbid or prurient interest, enjoys no protection under the
Constitution's First Amendment and may not be broadcast over the
airwaves at any time.2 Indecency, meanwhile, has been defined by the
FCC as "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs
and activities";3 the First Amendment prohibits the government from
completely banning indecent material, but restrictions on the times
during which indecency may appear via broadcast airwaves have been
approved by the Supreme Court.4 The most undefined-and, until
recently, the most ignored-portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 concerns
"profane language." Given the Supreme Court's 2008 Term
consideration of an appeal in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,5
however, that will apparently change. The Court scheduled oral
arguments for November 4, 2008.
The term "profane language" admits no easy definition, let alone
general agreement regarding its place in American society and the
extent to which the government should attempt to regulate it.6 The
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2008).
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
3. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978).
4. Id.
5. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
128 S.Ct. 1647 (Mar. 17, 2008).
6. In the days immediately following the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in the
Fox case, for example, a handful of newspaper editorial writers railed against allowing the
government to ask broadcasters to stop certain profanities. For example, the Concord
Monitor editorialized against the FCC's position in the Supreme Court case, arguing that
"f-" and "s-," when used on live television in 2002 and 2003, had nothing to do with sex
or excretion. See Unsigned Editorial, A Slip Of the Tongue Shouldn't Mean a Fine,
CONCORD MONITOR, April 9, 2008. See also Unsigned Editorial, Broadcast TV and
'Fleeting Obscenities,' ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, March 23, 2008, at 5 (urging the
Supreme Court to affirm the Second Circuit's opinion); Unsigned Editorial, Dirty Word
Games, L.A. TIMES, March 22, 2008, at 22 (same). On the other hand, in an editorial
published in USA Today, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin cited statistics indicating that
three-fourths of adults in the United States support the FCC's efforts to enforce strict
standards regarding profanity and indecency on television. See Kevin J. Martin, Defenses
Can And Do Fail, USA TODAY, March 31, 2008, at 11A. Martin also cited a Parents
current Supreme Court appeal pits a newly aggressive content
regulator in the FCC versus a newly aggressive broadcast industry
led, in this case, by Rupert Murdoch and his News Corporation' but
joined also by erstwhile competitors NBC, CBS and ABC.8 Rhetoric
abounds from both sides of the debate. Timothy F. Winter, president
of the Parents Television Council, wrote in a newspaper op-ed piece
that the lower court decision invalidating the FCC's new approach
"had, in essence, stolen the airwaves from the public and handed
ownership over to the broadcast industry." 9 Meanwhile, broadcast
executives claim a loss in the case for them would mean the death of
live television."° In light of the FCC's decision now to act on Congress'
command to regulate its use in broadcasting," profanity must be
considered from social, historical and legal perspectives apart from
obscenity and indecency.
One scholar noted that the Latin roots of the word "profane"
connote "to desecrate or violate a temple"; this blasphemy-related
Television Council study finding that profanity had increased on "family hour" TV 95
percent between 1998 and 2002. Id.
7. In what the Washington Post called an "unusually aggressive step" that signaled
its all-out war on decency regulation, Fox in March 2008 refused to pay $91,000 in fines
stemming from a 2003 broadcast of a show called "Married By America" that featured
digitally obscured nudity--even though the FCC had agreed to reduce the fines from a
total of $1.2 million. See Frank Ahrens, Fox Refuses to Pay 2004 Indecency Fine,
WASHINGTON POST, March 25, 2008.
8. An unrelated but similar challenge to the FCC's suddenly more strict approach to
regulating indecency on television resulted in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit vacating a $550,000 forfeiture order against CBS for the brief, unscripted broadcast
of Janet Jackson's exposed breast during the Super Bowl halftime show in 2004. See CBS
Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008).
9. Timothy F. Winter, Profanity On Airwaves Not a "Right," FLORIDA SUN-
SENTINEL, April 13, 2008, at 5F. Winter stated that virtually no parents want their children
exposed to even a single profanity "on the street, let alone ... [in] their living rooms
during the early evening hours on network television." Id. He said broadcasters could
institute a five-second delay but choose not to, and he warned the Supreme Court that a
decision to affirm the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit "would
defy overwhelming public sentiment." Id. Even Winter, though, seemed to realize that the
current Supreme Court case likely won't resolve the issue; he called on Congress to
explicitly state that fleeting expletives are prohibited on daytime and evening broadcast
television. Id.
10. Frank Ahrens, TV Decency Showdown Heads to Supreme Court, ST. PAUL
PIONEER-PRESS, April 13, 2008, at A8.
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464; FCC, In the Matter of Various Complaints Against
Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19
F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978-80 (March 18, 2004).
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meaning has evolved now to encompass "more secular objects." 2
Thus, profanity came to include within its ambit the demeaning of
sex; the word "obscenity," too, had its beginnings in sacrilege before
moving to the netherworld of carnality. 3 In this sense, the meaning of
profanity has become secularized along with much of the rest of
contemporary society, and in the second half of the 20th century the
taboo profanities in America shifted dramatically from references to
Deity to references to sensuality.14 Given the likelihood that this
historical pattern could repeat itself, and given that "people swear by
what is most potent to them . . ,15 it is plausible that Murdoch's
functionaries at Fox could convince the Supreme Court Justices in
their 2008 Term that "f-" and "s-" have no real sexual or excretory
meani anymore-or, at least, no sexual or excretory meaning that
cannot be wielded freely, openly and with impunity even when doing
so invades the privacy, or "quiet enjoyment," of the homes of those
who do not want to hear it. 7
The Supreme Court constitutionalized "f-" nearly four decades
ago," and so in that sense the current Fox case-stemming from live
broadcasts of the term uttered by, respectively, the global rock star
Bono at the 2003 Golden Globe awards; the over-the-hill-but-in-
denial actress Cher at the 2002 Billboard Awards; and the Simple Life
12. GEOFFREY HUGHES, SWEARING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FOUL LANGUAGE,
OATHS AND PROFANITY IN ENGLISH 246-47 (1991). See also Nomi Stolzenberg, The
Profanity of Law, in LAW AND THE SACRED at 36 (Sarat et al., ed., 2007) ("In the ancient
world, the profane referred literally, and without any value judgment, to the area of space
directly before ('pro') the temple ('fanum'): profanum. Only in its second definition did
the Latin profanum acquire the pejorative connotations of impiousness, wickedness, and
ignorance.").
13. HUGHES, supra note 12, at 246-47. See also GEOFFREY HUGHES, AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SWEARING 362 (2006) ("All the principal synonyms for swearing,
notability profanity, blasphemy, and obscenity, originally had strong religious denotations.
This is now generally only true of blasphemy .... ) (emphasis in original).
14. HUGHES, supra note 12, at 248-49.
15. Id. at 249.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. This raises the question of what could become the new profanity. If Deity and
copulation are out, then perhaps some future blasphemers will take their cue from naive
computer users not yet accustomed to electronic security passwords: "'God,' 'sex' and
'money' are among the most popular passwords for those who are unschooled in computer
security." Jennifer 8. Lee, And the Password Is... Waterloo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001.
See also Jennifer 8. Lee, Forgot a Password? Try Way2Many, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999
("[H]acker folklore says some of the most popular individual passwords are sex, love, god,
password, secret and qwerty.").
18. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
denizen Nicole Richie at the 2003 Billboard Awards1 --can break no
new ground. In fact, the cachet of the word has faded so greatly one
wonders why individuals such as Bono, Cher, and Richie even bother
to use it. Lexicographers have been wearing out the term since 1598,20
and even tedious law professors have mind-numbingly exhausted its
possibilities in fits of adolescence." In the broadcast context, the late
George Carlin forever linked himself with the prank of saying on the
radio the "seven dirty words" one is not supposed to say on the
radio."
19. See FCC, In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975
(March 18, 2004); FCC, In the Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television
Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (Nov. 6,
2006). Although somewhat eclipsed, at least initially in the popular consciousness, by the
furor that followed Janet Jackson's infamous wardrobe malfunction during the 2004 Super
Bowl, the three cases of fleeting expletives on live television have together constituted
some of the most important broadcast regulation litigation in a generation. The first of
these took place January 19, 2003 on NBC's live broadcast of the Golden Globes. While
on stage to receive an award, U2's lead singer, Bono, proclaimed to millions of American
viewers, "This is really, really f-ing brilliant." Bono's exclamation was reminiscent of a
similar incident the previous year at the 2002 Billboard Awards broadcast in which Cher
stated during her own acceptance speech, "People have been telling me I'm on the way
out every year, right? So, f- 'em." Another incident occurred at the 2003 Billboard
Awards when Nicole Richie, while presenting an award, asked the audience, "Have you
ever tried to get horse s- out of a Prada purse? It's not so f-ing simple." Id. The FCC's
Enforcement Bureau made an initial determination that Bono's statement was not
indecent. The decision hinged on the view that the word was used as an "adjective or
expletive" rather than a "description of sexual or excretory activity or organs" and thus
could not be indecent. FCC Enforcement Bureau, In the Matter of Complaints Against
Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards"
Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859 (Oct. 3, 2003). Five months later, commissioners overturned
the Enforcement Bureau's ruling, holding that "[t]he 'F-Word' is one of the most vulgar,
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language" and "[i]ts use
invariably invokes a coarse sexual image." FCC, In the Matter of Complaints Against
Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards"
Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (March 18, 2004). However, the Second Circuit held in mid-
2007 that the FCC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously or abused its discretion in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), by beginning to
regulate fleeting expletives. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir.
2007). In addition to the Supreme Court appeal, a fair amount of congressional posturing
ensued. One legislative proposal, the "Protecting Children From Indecent Programming
Act" (H.R. 3559, S. 1780), would require the FCC to target even single words and images
as indecent programming.
20. See HUGHES, supra note 12, at vii (noting inclusion of the Italian "fottere" in the
1598 Worlde of Wordes by John Florio).
21. See Christopher M. Fairman, F-, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711 (2007).
22. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-55.
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Given this history of dubious achievements in profanity, what is
left to be at stake in the current appeal before the U.S. Supreme
Court? First, it seems relatively clear that the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit engaged in some convenient but doctrinally
questionable jurisprudence by concluding (in a 2-1 decision) that the
FCC had violated the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting a
new rule regulating profanity.23 This portion of the Second Circuit's
opinion, holding that the FCC's change in course was not "reasoned"
in relying on the goal of preventing television consumers from
absorbing the "first blow" of fleeting expletives,24 seems the most
obvious candidate for Supreme Court focus.25 But speculation in the
newspapers, at least, runs rampant that the Court will reach the
constitutional merits of the profanity issue in what is being billed as
"the first case on broadcast decency to go before the Supreme Court
in 30 years., 26 If the Court gets past issues of administrative
23. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), certiorari
granted by 128 S.Ct. 1647.
24. Id. at 458.
25. Both the government and Fox spent the overwhelming majority of their briefs to
the Supreme Court discussing the administrative deference question. See Brief for
Petitioners at 20-41, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S. brief filed June
2, 2008), available at 2008 WL 2308909; Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc.
at 18-42, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S. brief filed Aug. 1, 2008),
available at 2008 WL 3153439. The principles of administrative law are familiar if not clear.
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984),
the Supreme Court held that when Congress expressly delegates authority to an
administrative agency to regulate in a certain area, "[s]uch. .. regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." In this case, notwithstanding the Second Circuit's conclusion to the contrary, it
hardly seems the FCC acted without reasoned basis whatsoever. See Julie Hilden, "The
Fight Over 'Fleeting Expletives': How a Grant of Supreme Court Review May Lead to
Expanded FCC Power and Reduced First Amendment Rights for Broadcasters," at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20080331.html (last visited May 17, 2008) ("This ruling
was odd, to say the least. It wasn't the case that the record was blank; far from it. In fact,
the FCC had cited a number of different bases for the change - so this ruling was
tantamount to a claim that not one of these bases counted as being even minimally
'reasoned.' Put more bluntly, the majority was saying that the FCC was not only wrong,
but irrational."). See also Justin Winquist, Note, Arbitrary and FA@#$*! Capricious: An
Analysis of the Second Circuit's Rejection of the FCC's Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 723 (2008) (arguing that the FCC
order was not arbitrary and capricious).
26. Unsigned Editorial, Should the Supreme Court Overturn FCC Policy on
Obscenities? Yes, KANSAS CITY STAR, April 10, 2008, at B8. Newspaper speculation,
however, is off-target in at least some regards. For example, the Kansas City Star
somewhat speciously suggested that the outcome of the Fox case could lead to more
sinister government regulation of speech: "Once the government can decide what is
obscene, they can easily move on to what is 'dangerous' speech because it disagrees with
deference,27 in the current or a future appeal, then the core questions
seem to become (1) what is the meaning of profanity in today's
society?; and (2) assuming profanity can be defined, how far may the
FCC go in regulating its use on television?
This article proceeds to examine those questions in four
substantive parts. Section II examines the history and contemporary
status of profanity in society and law. Section III discusses in detail
the rationales behind the First Amendment's protection of
expression, as applied to profanity. Section IV reviews the FCC's
evolution from regulating profanity as indecency to, in its current
effort, regulating profanity primarily as profanity. Section V posits
that, assuming profanity is expression, its broadcast into the home
presents a unique legal posture due to the Supreme Court's extreme
solicitude to the privacy of the home.
II. Brief Legal History of Profanity
Approximately 1450 B.C., Moses came down from Mt. Sinai and
instructed the Israelites that God had commanded, "Thou shalt not
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain . ,,28 More than two
millennia later, the injunction given to the Anglo-Saxons in the Laws
of Alfred had changed slightly to, "Do not ever swear by the heathen
gods."29 In the Middle English period there was a subtle shift in focus
from "swearing by" to "swearing at."3° Punishments for swearing
under Henry I (1068-1135) included fines, whipping and branding
the politics of the current administration." Id. This statement, of course, ignores the fact
that the federal government has defined and regulated obscenity for decades, and that the
Supreme Court has held that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
27. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government asked the Court to remand the
case to the circuit court for consideration, in the first instance, of constitutional issues the
Second Circuit only made "observations" about in its 2007 opinion. See Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 25, at 42. Even if the Supreme Court does not address the
constitutional issues in the current appeal, it seems likely the Court will again be asked to
do so in the future. The broadcast networks NBC, CBS and ABC, in a brief filed
separately from Fox, tackled the constitutional issue head-on and urged the Court to find
that the FCC cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, regulate broadcast fleeting
expletives. See Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc., et al. at 15-47, FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S. brief filed Aug. 1, 2008), available at 2008 WL
3153438.
28. Exodus 20:7 (King James Version).
29. HUGHES, supra note 12, at 43.
30. Id. at 56.
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with a hot iron.3' By the time of the Renaissance, the regulation of
profanity had shifted from sectarian to secular authorities; the English
Crown created the position of Master of the Revels in 1574 to
approve ex ante the content of theater productions, although
"linguistic censorship" did not begin until 1606.32 The "Act to
Restraine Abuses of Players" prohibited "prophanely speak[ing] or
us[ing] the holy name of God or of Christ Jesus, or of the Holy
Ghoste. ... "
Some observers concluded that the U.S. frontier, with its
exuberance and lack of restraint, fostered "strong language" even
beyond that commonly heard in England, which was itself described
by one 19th century author as "rather a foul-mouthed nation. 3 4 Use
of profanity, though, is not universal; certain cultures, "including the
American Indians, the Japanese, the Malayans and most Polynesians,
do not swear. 35 Even though Americans may have appeared uncouth
to British observers, colonists preserved the common law's
punishments for profanities that disturbed community peace and
enjoyment and, in so doing, constituted public nuisances.36
A. Profanity Under the Common Law of Nuisance
The common law of nuisance has regulated public profanity for
hundreds of years.38 When combined with blasphemy, profanity could
31. Id. at 59-60 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 102-03.
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id. at 1, 168 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
36. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
37. The law of nuisance sanctions "unreasonable interference" with common public
rights and generally requires "a significant interference with the public health, the public
safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience [.]" Public Nuisance,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (2007). The repetitiveness or duration of
interference is an important consideration, and therefore brief or one-time occurrences
may not rise to the level of punishable public nuisances. Id. See also John Kimpflen,
Blasphemy and Profanity, 12 AM.JUR.2D Blasphemy and Profanity § 10 (2007). Common-
law criminal public nuisances include minor offenses posing risk of public harm or
discomfort such as storage of explosives or dissemination of bad odors. Public Nuisance,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B. Not all public nuisances are criminal in
nature and thus subject to the penalty of incarceration or criminal fine. Some public
nuisances are considered civil in nature and thus the remedy might include damages,
abatement or injunction. Id. Justice George Sutherland's allusion to the "pig in the parlor"
aptly summarizes the law of nuisance. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926).
BROADCAST PROFANITY
support a criminal conviction under English common law.3 9 An early
U.S. case clarified that "profane swearing" was not indictable as a
crime without evidence that the profanity had caused a "disturbance
[or] injury .. . to those who hear it." ° Profane swearing was later
equated with drunkenness: When either was repeatedly committed in
public or in such a way to "become an annoyance and inconvenience
to the citizens at large[,]" a criminal indictment for common nuisance
was in order.4' For profane swearing committed just once, however,
the sanction was minor; the single profanity was to be dealt with
"summarily by a justice of the Peace" through a small fine. 2 In the
19th century a single instance of loud and public swearing in North
Carolina was found not to constitute an indictable nuisance crime
even though it disturbed a "singing school" nearby. 3 Instead, the
swearing must have inconvenienced or disturbed the whole
community in order to rise to the level of a criminally punishable
nuisance; the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the standard
that the profanity would have had to "very gravely influence the good
order or enjoyment or convenience of the citizens in general.""
Repetition of the swearing, in loud and public ways, could eventually
rise to the level of a community-wide nuisance punishable by the
criminal law.45
Swearing in public required not just repeated profanities in a
place where members of the public might hear; instead, prosecutors
carried the burden to demonstrate that other individuals did in fact
hear and were disturbed. 46 Nineteenth century state courts also
suggested that a single swearing incident could lead to a criminal
indictment, although that would be the rare exception.43 In the case of
38. See, e.g., Bowman et al. v. Secular Soc'y, [1917] A.C. 406 (House of Lords)
(opinion of Lord Sumner) (reviewing the British history, beginning in about the 17th
century, of sanctions for profanity, which was related to blasphemy).
39. Id.
40. State v. Kirby, 1 Mur. 254, 5 N.C. 254 (N.C. 1809).
41. State v. Ellar, 1 Dev. 267, 12 N.C. 267 (N.C. 1827).
42. Id.
43. State v. Baldwin, 1 Dev. & Bat. 195, 18 N.C. 195 (N.C. 1835).
44. Id.
45. Id. (stating "[i]t is possible that a frequent and habitual repetition of acts which
singly are but private annoyances may constitute a public or common nuisance.").
46. State v. Jones, 9 Ired. 38, 31 N.C. 38 (N.C. 1848).
47. Gaines v. State, 75 Tenn. 410 (Tenn. 1881) ("It is possible, however, to conceive
of cases where even a single oath, either by its terms, its tone or manner, might, under the
peculiar circumstances, be held to be a nuisance. But such cases would constitute
exceptions to the general rule.").
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a man who swore twice-once at a home and once on a public street
of East Knoxville at 9 p.m.-in the presence of a prosecutor and his
wife, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that only a minor
nuisance claim could be sustained.48 Hence the penalty was not jail
time or a criminal fine but rather a "small pecuniary penalty for each
oath, recoverable before a justice of the peace.,
49
Public profanity uttered on "divers days" before "divers persons"
could clearly constitute a criminal nuisance, ° but the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in 1881 also upheld a jury verdict of guilt for public
profanity shouted loudly during a single five-minute episode:
To become a public nuisance, the conduct of a party must pass
beyond the point of being injurious to individuals, and be hurtful and
offensive to the community; and it may be difficult to prove that the
use of profane words but for the space of five consecutive moments,
could so inconvenience the community as to amount to a nuisance;
yet we can suppose such cases, and surely, the fact that it may be
difficult to establish an offence, and punish the offender, cannot be a
valid reason for relaxing the law with regard to it. But, in this case,
the jury have [sic] said that such was the consequence attending the
defendant's conduct, and the door is therefore closed as to him,
against any further inquiry into that question.5'
A man who was convicted of criminal nuisance for a one-minute
profane tirade was able to win reversal of the conviction on appeal,
although the reversal was not due to the fact that one minute was too
short for profanity to constitute a nuisance. 2 Instead, the appellate
court reversed the conviction because the indictment, or charging
document, contained three deficiencies: it failed to set forth the actual
profane words used and instead merely stated that the defendant "did
curse[,] swear and blaspheme the name of Almighty God"; it failed to
allege that the profanity was repetitive; and it failed to allege that the
profanity was heard by multiple citizens nearby.53 Early U.S.
common-law court decisions generally did not focus on the duration
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. State v. Brewington, 84 N.C. 783 (N.C. 1881).
51. State v. Chrisp, 85 N.C. 528 (N.C. 1881).
52. State v. Barham, 79 N.C. 646 (N.C. 1878).
53. Id. See also State v. Powell, 70 N.C. 67 (N.C. 1874) (reversing a conviction for
criminal nuisance due to insufficiency of an indictment even though facts showed the
defendant used loud profanity "from dark until 11 o'clock at night" such that people in the
streets and houses as far away as 300 yards could hear).
of uttered profanity but rather its repetitive nature; a man convicted
for 12 seconds of profanity ultimately prevailed on appeal due to
failure of the indictment to allege repetition, among other flaws.4
Although a single instance of profane swearing might not have
been indictable as a criminal nuisance or other common-law crime,
courts into the late 19th century approved the idea that a state
legislature could pass a criminal law punishing a single profanity.5 In
1931 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
conviction of a man for violating the Radio Act of 1927, prohibiting
the use of profane language on broadcast radio. Well into the 20th
century, however, some courts still related profanity statutes to
blasphemy; a Jehovah's Witness in Wyoming who vigorously invoked
the name of Deity while gathering signatures on a petition was held
not to have committed the misdemeanor crime of profanity. 7 The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that it was not enough that the man
had shown "manifest or implied contempt of sacred things" or
"irreveren[ce] toward God or holy things."58 Instead, profanity
required "imprecation of divine vengeance" or "divine
condemnation."59 Still, in 1987 the U.S. Supreme Court listed public
profanity among other public nuisances interfering with "public
morals. '
Swearing became more common in the United States after
soldiers returned from World War II, but the trend did not
immediately spill over onto television, which was considered "a
family medium" and thus "was constrained by even more rigorous
prohibitions against nudity, profanity and immorality than film.
61
Television advertisers, too, at least initially constituted a pressure
54. State v. Pepper, 68 N.C. 259 (N.C. 1873). That the repetitive nature of profanity is
not necessarily dictated by its duration was illustrated by a case in which a man uttered
profanities for two hours and yet won reversal of a criminal nuisance conviction because of
the indictment's failure to allege repetitiveness. State v. Jones, 9 Ired. 38, 31 N.C. 38 (N.C.
1848).
55. Ex Parte Delaney, 43 Cal. 478 (Cal. 1872).
56. Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931) (noting the relationship
between profanity and blasphemy and stating that the man had said certain individuals
would be "damned," had used the phrase "By God" and had stated that he would call a
curse of God upon some people).
57. Town of Torrington v. Taylor, 137 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1943).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 624.
60. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.5 (1987) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 583-85 (4th ed. 1971)).
61. HUGHES, supra note 12, at 199.
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group to keep television shows "clean," apparently in order not to
offend viewers and potential consumers. 2 Eventually, changes in
American society's view toward profanity occurred,63 and those
changes were reflected in Supreme Court opinions. Other early
American attitudes, such as the idea that profanity can rise to the
level of a public nuisance and be thus punished, have been preserved
notwithstanding the constitutional protection extended to profanity in
the latter half of the 20th century.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court and Profanity
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered, in various contexts,
whether profanity is protected by the First Amendment. For example,
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,64 the mid-19th century Court
reviewed the constitutionality of a conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
in New Hampshire who, while being confronted by police officers
over complaints of public disturbance, directed expletives at one of
the officers. While the Court acknowledged that the freedom of
speech is "among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion of state
action,, 65 it ultimately found that profanity was an example of the
"certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem." ' Further, the Court cited Zechariah
Chafee in concluding that vulgar or profane words
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
67
Holding that the First Amendment had not been offended, the Court
affirmed the man's conviction.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., TIMOTHY JAY, WHY WE CURSE 266 (2000) ("We found that curse
words are normal, frequent, contextually relevant, and informative."); TIMOTHY JAY,
CURSING IN AMERICA 15 (1992) ("Cursing and dirty word use also change over time and
are influenced by social forces ... .
64. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
65. Id. at 570-71.
66. Id. at 571-72.
67. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
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Nearly three decades later in Cohen v. California8 the Court
considered the constitutional status of vulgarity used not as a mere
epithet, as in Chaplinsky, but rather as part of a political statement. In
1968 Paul Robert Cohen was arrested in the hallway of the Los
Angeles County Courthouse for wearing a jacket that carried the
message: "F- the Draft." 69 The Court found that Cohen's message
could not be labeled obscene because it lacked eroticism.
Additionally, the profanity in question could not be classified as
fighting words since the phrase was not directed at anyone in
particular and no incitement occurred."
Finally, the argument that the message subjected people to
unwanted speech was rejected as the speech took place in a public
setting outside the sanctuary of the home.' The Court did not,
however, alter the essential rule from Chaplinsky that the First
Amendment would not prohibit government regulation of profane
speech that rose to the level of a public nuisance; the Cohen Court
merely held that the particular breach of the peace regulation in
question was too broad but that it might have been constitutionally
permissible had it, for example, targeted only "loud ... vulgar,
profane or indecent language within the presence or hearing of
women or children. 72 The Court conceded that Cohen's expression
"is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre," but
concluded that government should not wade into "matters of taste
and style., 73 The Court latched onto the idea that constitutionally
protected communication can aim for emotional impact and not
merely information exchange, and to replace Cohen's profanity with a
euphemism would have watered down the potential emotional force
of his message. In defending the right of the freedom of speech, the
Court evoked a Meiklejohnian self-governance rationale:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
68. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 21-22.
72. Id. at 22 n.4.
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id. at 26.
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freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.7 5
Given this context, the Court's holding thus stands for the
proposition that the First Amendment may protect profanity when it
is part of a political message that could not be expressed as effectively
if sanitized. Three justices dissented from the majority opinion and
would have held that, under Chaplinsky, Cohen's speech was not
protected by the First Amendment.76
In the decade after Cohen, Supreme Court opinions at times
protected specific uses of profanity but did not alter Chaplinsky's
essential rule and its endorsement of Chafee's nuisance rationale for
profane speech. In Hess v. Indiana,77 for example, the Supreme Court
held that the disorderly conduct conviction of a student anti-war
protester who muttered "We'll take the f-ing street later (or again)"
in the vicinity of a police officer was unconstitutional."8 The Court
concluded that Gregory Hess' statement constituted neither obscenity
nor fighting words.79 Most relevant for this manuscript, however, the
Court also rejected the idea that the phrase could have constituted a
public nuisance because there had not been a "showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner."' 8 Importantly, the Court did not hold that the
First Amendment prohibited speech from being deemed a public
nuisance; instead, the Court merely said that such a conclusion
required a sufficient justification, which the prosecution had not
undertaken in Hess.8'
Similarly, other precedents-even when seemingly extending
First Amendment protection to certain uses of profanity-have not
altered the longstanding rule that profane or vulgar speech could
become a public nuisance subject to government sanction.82 Instead,
75. Id. at 24.
76. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
78. Id. at 107.
79. Id. at 107-08.
80. Id. at 108.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)
(concluding that a municipality's denial of use of its theater for a production of the musical
"Hairspray" was not constitutionally permissible because it lacked the necessary
procedural safeguards against unconstitutional prior restraint, but not prohibiting nuisance
the U.S. Supreme Court has, in contemporary times, endorsed the
conclusion that government-imposed exclusion of certain profane
words from the marketplace of ideas does not infringe First
Amendment rights." This is particularly so when the offensive speech
"intrudes on the privacy of the home."' Thus, in the constitutional
landscape prior to Pacifica the Court permitted application of the
nuisance rationale to regulate speech when the speech did not serve
an important role in furthering the marketplace of ideas or self-
85
governance.
As is well known, the Court in Pacifica held that George Carlin's
monologue, though not obscene, constituted indecency within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 because it contained "patently offensive
references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." Recalling
Chaplinsky, the Pacifica Court held that Carlin's so-called "dirty
words" were "no essential part of any exposition of ideas. '' 87 The
Court evoked the language of nuisance law when it held that "[w]ords
that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another." In
other words, the pervasive nature of broadcasting in the home (or
private car) and unique accessibility by children made Carlin's
profanity "merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard., 89 Key to the Pacifica holding was the
repetitive nature of the profane monologue; the facts of the case did
law from being applied to speech); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (reversing a
criminal obscenity conviction due to lack of fair notice of one element of the offense, but
not prohibiting nuisance law from being applied to speech); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating an ordinance banning nudity on drive-in
movie screens because the regulation did not target sexually oriented images and hence
was too broad, but not prohibiting nuisance law from being applied to speech); Papish v.
Board of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that a
university violated the Constitution by expelling a student editor for publishing a political
cartoon depicting rape of the Statute of Liberty by a policeman and a vulgar but non-
obscene headline in an independent newspaper distributed on campus).
83. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 871 (1982) (stating, in a case involving exclusion from school libraries of certain
books, "an unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown that
petitioners had decided to remove the books at issue because those books were
pervasively vulgar") (emphasis in original).
84. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209.
85. See supra notes 82-83.
86. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
87. Id. at 746.
88. Id. at 747.
89. Id. at 750 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926) (majority opinion of Sutherland, J.)).
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not require consideration of the status of fleeting expletives, and that
issue was left for another day.
The Court conceded that some limited self-censorship by
broadcasters could occur as a result of the Pacifica holding, but the
Justices concluded this would generally "deter only the broadcasting
of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and
activities. While some of these references may be protected, they
surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern."9 The Court
majority did not view indecent speech as essential to the expression of
ideas in the marketplace: "A requirement that indecent language be
avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the
content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts
that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language."91
After Pacifica, the Court held that Texas' nuisance abatement
procedures were constitutionally deficient when applied to motion
pictures.92 This holding, however, relied extensively on the procedural
safeguards required by Freedman v. Maryland,93 and the 21st century
Supreme Court has all but eviscerated the Freedman safeguards.94 As
a result, it is questionable whether the holding of Vance regarding
nuisance in the First Amendment context remains viable,95 but in any
case, that opinion's holding hinged on the unique factual setting of
censorship in licensing motion pictures for exhibition, and those same
facts are not present in the FCC's after-the-fact fines against
broadcasters for profanity on television. In Pacifica, the Supreme
Court explicitly held that the FCC's post-broadcast regulation was
not censorship. 96
C. Profanity's Place in the Law Today
One of the most common and prominent arguments of the
networks and their supporters is that profanity is simply too rampant
90. Id. at 743.
91. Id. at 743 n.18.
92. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
93. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
94. See Edward L. Carter and Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior
Restraint, Due Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11
COMM. L. & POL'Y 225 (2006).
95. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 n.4. (1986) (speculating in
dicta that if the government targeted a bookstore for closure as a nuisance due to erotic
material, there "might [be] a claim of selective prosecution").
96. 438 U.S. at 737-38.
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in society to even attempt to regulate it on television.' While it may
be true that profanity can be regularly heard on the street or in the
public-school hallway, it is not the case that the law has abandoned all
attempts to regulate profanity in contemporary society. In fact, a non-
exhaustive review of some situations in which profanity is still legally
punishable reveals that while profanity exists in abundance in society
and apparently always has, 8 the use of profanity in modern America
is not necessarily appropriate or socially and legally condoned in
every setting. In other words, the network proponents' argument
(because profanity is everywhere, we should allow it anywhere),
emanates from a false premise; profanity is not, indeed, everywhere."
For example, at the behest of Congress in the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, profanity is not-at least not without the right to
compensatory damages-allowed as part of debt collection by a debt
collector." Similarly, notwithstanding the First Amendment's
protection of speech, quasi-government transportation systems do not
violate the Constitution when they prohibit advertisements
containing profanity on public buses and subway trains.' °1
Although many high school students undoubtedly use profanity
and consider themselves sophisticated for doing so, 2 profanity need
not-and, indeed, in some cases, may not-be abetted by school
officials. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bethel School District
97. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Bono, The Culture Wars, and a Profane Decision: The
FCC's Reversal of Course on Indecency Determinations and Its New Path on Profanity, 28
SEATrLE U. L. REv. 61, 80 (2004) ("The broadcast of an occasional, unintentional, and
unexpected expletive by NBC hardly constitutes a drop in the ocean of profanity to which
people of all ages are exposed.").
98. Even General George Washington in 1776 chided his soldiers for "the foolish,
and wicked practice, of profane cursing and swearing[,]" Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted), but the
unsurprising fact that profanity is common among soldiers at war still presents a markedly
different situation than use of profanity, for example, by an insurance company's district
manager directed at subordinates in the contemporary workplace. Id.
99. For example, the city of South Pasadena, California, declared itself "cuss-free"
for one week during March 2008, after efforts by South Pasadena High School freshman
McKay Hatch, who started a No Cussing Club that soon boasted 10,000 members in 50
states. Bob Pool, "S. Pasadena Does So Solemnly Not Swear," L.A. TIMES, March 6, 2008.
But see Melanie B. Glover, What the Heck? Casual Cursing By Teens Is Rising, DESERET
NEWS, Feb. 25, 2008 (noting that one expert, Timothy Jay, "estimates that the average
adolescent uses roughly 80 to 90 swear words a day").
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (Sept. 20, 1977). See also, e.g.,
Harvey v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 329-30 (6th Cir. 2006).
101. Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
102. See supra note 99.
20081
HASTINGS COMMJENT L.J.
v. Fraser"3 has been interpreted by lower courts to mean that "a
school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane
language."' 4 Although it might seem logical that the most common
profanity-in-school case would involve a student who wants to swear
and is prohibited from doing so,' °5 sometimes the calculus is reversed.
In the states comprising the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, at least, students enjoy the right not to be forced by their
teachers to utter profanities in contravention of their personal or
religious convictions/°6
Meanwhile, the principle of a (partially, at least) profanity-free
school zone governs the conduct of teachers and parents as well as
students. For example, a high school teacher fired for allowing
students to use profanity in class writing assignments could not
prevail in an action for an alleged First Amendment violation
because, by allowing profanity, she had transgressed a legitimate
school policy. 7 Similarly, in early 2008 an Iowa school district was
held not to have acted improperly in firing a high school basketball
coach who, among other things, directed profanity at his players in
violation of a provision in the district coaches' handbook.' °8 An Ohio
appeals court in 2007 upheld the conviction, under a municipality's
safe schools ordinance, of a parent who yelled profanities in school
hallways after a meeting with her children's principal."°
Similarly, government may constitutionally excise profanity
completely from the courtroom and, more generally, the practice of
law."0 This applies to litigants, lawyers and even judges. An Illinois
criminal defendant who used profanity during a pretrial hearing was
103. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
104. Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001), cited in Guiles
ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 2006).
105. This type of case does exist. See, e.g., R.D.W. v. Natchez-Adams Sch. Dist., 987
So.2d 1038 (Miss. 2008 ) (upholding the suspension of a high school student who directed
profanity at the school's assistant principal.).
106. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (University of Utah was
not entitled to summary judgment in a lawsuit brought by an acting student who alleged
violations of her First Amendment rights when she was punished for refusing to use
profanity as part of her course assignments).
107. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998).
108. Board of Directors of Ames Community Sch. Dist. v. Cullinan, 745 N.W.2d 487
(Iowa 2008). See also State v. Fettig, 884 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (charge of
battery dismissed against Indiana high school gym teacher who slapped student's face to
stop her from yelling profanities at other students).
109. Toledo v. Thompson-Bean, 879 N.E.2d 799 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
110. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
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held in criminal contempt and sentenced to 180 days in jail; on appeal,
the sentence-to run consecutive to other jail time-was upheld."' A
lawyer was suspended from practicing law in federal district court for
three years for using profanity in his practice; during one mediation,
he had called opposing counsel a "f-ing liar."'"1 2 The discipline was
upheld on appeal."' A state court judge in Maryland who used
profanity in addressing criminal defendants and others in his
courtroom received a 30-day suspension without pay."
4
Although prisons are notorious for the colorful language inmates
speak, profanity may be strictly regulated in that setting."' A New
York jail inmate who shouted profanities at a laundry supervisor
violated an inmate rule prohibiting the creation of a disturbance."6 A
prison employee's declaration constituted sufficient evidence that an
inmate had directed profanities at other inmates, in violation of a
prison rule, such that the inmate could not succeed on a retaliatory
discipline claim."7 The use of profanity and threats by prison guards is
evidence of malicious intent in a lawsuit for infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."8 Prison
guards can also be fired for using profanity."
9
Use of profanity in the workplace may be cause for termination
in various settings. An employee was legally terminated for using
profanity notwithstanding the employee's argument that use of
profanity in a stressful work setting was too minor to constitute cause
for termination under the employee union's collective bargaining
111. People v. Goodwin, 888 N.E.2d 140 (Il1. 2008). See also K.Q.S. v. Florida, 975
So.2d 536 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008) (juvenile's use of profanity during court proceeding held,
on appeal, to be just cause for multiple contempt citations and 80 days in secure
detention); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2007) (convicted criminal
defendant's sentence may be enhanced based on obstruction of justice for profane threats
to confidential informant); Warr v. State, 877 N.E.2d 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Illinois v.
Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
112. In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2005).
113. Id. See also In re Lee, 977 So.2d 852 (La. 2008) (lawyer who directed profanities
at judge was disciplined under the rules of professional conduct; his suspension from the
practice of law for 45 days was upheld on appeal).
114. In re Lambdin, 948 A.2d 54 (Md. 2008). See also Matter of Halverson, 169 P.3d
1161 (Nev. 2007) (state court judge suspended for, among other things, public use of
profanity).
115. See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
116. Smith v. Fischer, 852 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y.A.D. 2008).
117. Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008).
118. Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.11 (11th Cir. 2005).
119. Cygan v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 388 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 2004).
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agreement with the employer.20 Similarly, the use of profanity is
grounds for employment disciplinary action against a federal law
enforcement officer."' Police officers in Milwaukee may not direct
profanity at prisoners."' A "housing information vendor" who used
profanity to "chase ... away" disabled callers searching for housing,
in violation of the Fair Housing Act's non-discrimination provisions,
could be subject to punitive damages.'23 The Ninth Circuit saw no
constitutional or legal problem with a labor agreement under which
an employee was fired for twice using profanity; the fired employee,
however, prevailed in a sex discrimination lawsuit against the union
because it failed to represent her as zealously as it represented male
employees disciplined for using profanity."'
Profanity plays an integral role in many workplace sexual
harassment lawsuits. Although the federal anti-sexual harassment
law, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., "does not prohibit profanity
alone [,"" it is nevertheless the case that gender-specific profanity-
"which is to say more degrading to women than to men [,],,126 for
example-may rise to the level of unlawful sexual harassment. A
former shopworker was entitled to compensatory and punitive
damages from her former employer for its reckless disregard of her
right to be free from sexual discrimination, including sex-based
profanity.27 Conversely, the use of profanity by an alleged victim of
sexual harassment may constitute unprofessionalism and undermine
claims of harassment by others. 128 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a former women's soccer player at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill could proceed with a
lawsuit for violation of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of
profanity used by her former coach, Anson Dorrance. 9 Although
120. Hoffman v. Professional Med Team, 394 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2005).
121. Lane v. Dept. of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2008).
122. See Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rule 4, Section
2/455.00).
123. United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005).
124. Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874
(9th Cir. 2007).
125. Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1301.
126. Id. at 1302.
127. Parker v. General Extrusions, Inc., 491 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Louis v.
Mobil Chem. Co., 254 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2008) (use of profanity by a supervisor against an
employee may not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the profane
language used could be actionable as racial discrimination or harassment).
128. Moser v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 406 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005).
129. Jennings v. University of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007).
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much of his profane language was sexual in nature, the coach also
used the term "f-ing brilliant,"'3 ° the same term employed by Bono
at the Golden Globes in 2003.
Use of profanity occurs frequently in situations leading to
disorderly conduct and similar actions.11 In Georgia, using profanity
in a threat to fight a police officer constitutes obstruction of an
officer.3 2 A man's conviction for using profanity in violation of a
telephone harassment statute did not violate the First Amendment."'
The Sixth Circuit upheld a civil fine against an airport passenger who
used profanity, and thus caused a disruption, in an airport security
line in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 1540.109.114 County supervisors did not
violate an employee's clearly established free speech right when they
had her arrested for a "profanity-laced tirade" complaining about
excessive payroll taxes while refusing to leave a supervisor's office.'35
A motorist's use of profanity, coupled with other erratic behavior
during a late-night traffic stop, provided an officer with reasonable
suspicion of law violation to justify a pat-frisk.' All of these examples
illustrate that, when the profane pig is in the proverbial parlor, the
government is entitled to remove it. This does not mean, of course,
that the government will be allowed to keep the pig from enjoying life
in its pen; nor does it mean the no-pig-in-the-parlor rule can be
applied to non-pigs attempting to enter the parlor.'37
130. Id. at 711.
131. In re Mental Health of A.S.B., 180 P.3d 625 (Mont. 2008) (man who yelled
profanities at police officer in presence of children arrested for disorderly conduct and
ultimately committed involuntarily). See also Wisconsin v. Marten-Hoye, 746 N.W.2d 498
(Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (yelling of profanities sufficient reason for citation under disorderly
conduct statute); Montana v. Ashmore, 176 P.3d 1022 (Mont. 2008); Pennsylvania v.
O'Brien, 939 A.2d 912 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2007). But see, e.g., Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d
347, 359-60 (6th Cir. 2007) (Michigan law prohibiting "profanely curs[ing] or damn[ing] or
swear[ing] by the name of God, Jesus Christ or the Holy Ghost" was unconstitutional as
applied to a citizen who said "G-d-" at township board meeting where comment not
likely to cause fight).
132. Martin v. State, 662 S.E.2d 185, (Ga. 2008).
133. Washington v. Alphonse, 174 P.3d 684 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
134. Rendon v. Transportation Security Admin., 424 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2005).
135. Helms v. Zubaty, 495 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2007). But see Orem v. Rephann, 523
F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008) (officer who used Taser to subdue woman who shouted "f- you"
was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in civil-rights
violation action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d
1205 (10th Cir. 2008) (officers were held to have violated citizen's clearly established
constitutional right by arresting him merely for saying "bitch.").
136. United States v. Soares, 521 F.3d 117 (1st Cir. 2008).
137. The Federal Communications Commission, in its declaratory order in the Pacifica
case, put it this way: "The law of nuisance does not say, for example, that no one shall
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IIl. Free Speech Rationales and Profanity
The freedom of speech, created by 14 words in the Constitution's
First Amendment,3' has given birth to volumes of discussion in the
realm of legal philosophy and constitutional adjudication. Over the
years, several schools of thought have developed to explain the values
served by the First Amendment's protection of speech. Prominent is
the notion, championed by John Stuart Mill and Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., of an intellectual marketplace where everyone
is free to sell their ideas, with truth eventually triumphing.'39 In this
capitalistic conception of competitive communication, limiting
expression is harmful not so much to the speaker, but to the
community of listeners who must be free to hear and judge the value
of the speech for themselves.
Substantial debate has raged for decades about whether the
"marketplace of ideas" must include certain less desirable, or low
value, categories of speech, such as profanity. For example, Chafee
argued more than 50 years ago that profanity did not constitute an
idea and hence need not be protected within the marketplace of
ideas: "[P]rofanity and indecent talk and pictures, which do not form
an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social
value as a step toward truth[.]"'4 Because discerning truth is the
reason for allowing the free expression of ideas in the
Millian/Holmesian verbal marketplace, epithets that convey no ideas
capable of being true or false are viewed as worthless and, hence,
unworthy of constitutional protection. Even the "slight social value"
of profanity, in Chafee's view, is "clearly outweighed by the social
interests in order, morality, the training of the young, and the peace
of mind of those who hear and see.' 14' Further, profanity thwarted the
marketplace process because it allowed "little opportunity for the
usual process of counter-argument.'
42
maintain a pigsty; it simply says that no one shall maintain a pigsty in an inappropriate
place, such as a residential neighborhood." FCC, In the Matter of a Citizen's Complaint
Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
138. U.S., CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ").
139. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
140. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941).
141. Id.
142. Id.
Chafee even went so far as to equate obscenity and profanity
with other nuisances, such as smoking in a streetcar, that society had a
right to prohibit.143 Wellington agreed, writing that "speech often
hurts," and that "a great deal of other conduct that the state regulates
has less harmful potential."'" Ingber pointed out that the "imagery of
the marketplace of ideas is rooted in laissez-faire economics" and
posited that just as modern economists admit that some government
regulation is necessary to fix problems in the market, "state
intervention [may be] necessary to correct communicative market
failures."145 Hence, the Millian/Holmesian marketplace does not
appear to preclude government limits, particularly on speech largely
failing to facilitate the search for truth.
A second justification for freedom of speech has been the idea of
self-governance, most notably put forth by Alexander Meiklejohn.' 6
In this view, speech is seen as most valuable, and deserving of
protection, when it deals with political issues and allows citizens in a
democracy to govern themselves through making informed decisions.
Thus, limiting speech that is political in nature would be harmful, but
speech outside of the political arena is less valuable and therefore
subject to increased regulation. "[T]he First Amendment, then, is not
the guardian of unregulated talkativeness," Meiklejohn declared.147
Former U.S. Circuit Judge and Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork
agreed with Meiklejohn:
If the dialectical progression is not to become an analogical
stampede, the protection of the first amendment must be cut off
when it reaches the outer limits of political speech . . . . [The]
notion that all valuable types of speech must be protected by the
first amendment confuses the constitutionality of laws with their
wisdom. Freedom of nonpolitical speech rests, as does freedom for
other valuable forms of behavior, upon the enlightenment of
148society and its elected representatives.
143. Id.
144. Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L. J. 1105, 1106-07
(1979).
145. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1,
5 (1984).
146. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNANCE (1948).
147. Id. at 25.
148. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).
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However, Meiklejohn and Bork have their critics, including
Chafee, who declared the obscure line between political and non-
political speech to be problematic.14 9 Redish observed an even deeper
value than democracy being protected by the Constitution, arguing
that "individual self-realization" reached beyond the confines of
politics."' Hence,
free speech aids all life-affecting decision-making, no matter how
personally limited, in much the same manner in which it aids the
political process . . . . [There] thus is no logical basis for
distinguishing the role speech plays in the political process."'
Cass Sunstein seemed to take more of a middle ground in the
scholarly divide on the issue by arguing that "the First Amendment is
principally about political deliberation" and any speech that makes a
"contribution to public deliberation about some issue" should fit
under the rubric of political speech. "2
A third major area of free speech scholarship revolves around
the right of autonomy and self-fulfillment. Richards posited that "the
value of free expression, in this view, rests on its deep relation to self-
respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which
the life of the spirit is meager and slavish." '153 Likewise, Scanlon
initially joined the autonomy/self-fulfillment side, seeing government
involvement as anything but innocuous:
[To] regard himself as autonomous ... [a] person must see himself
as sovereign in deciding what to believe and in weighing competing
reasons for action . . . . [An] autonomous person cannot accept
without independent consideration the judgment of others as to
what he should believe or what he should do... . Conceding to the
state the right to [restrict expression] to secure compliance with its
laws [is] a concession that autonomous citizens could not make,
since it gives the state the right to deprive citizens of the grounds
for arriving at an independent judgment as to whether the law
114should be obeyed .
149. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 896 (1949).
150. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
151. Id. at 604.
152. Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255,301-04 (1992).
153. David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
154. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204,
215-18 (1972).
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However, Scanlon would later reject these notions, hypothesizing
that freedom to access information is just as important as the freedom
to express in the decision-making process, and deceptive
communication should not be given the same freedoms as other
communicative forms.155 Bork also took issue with the autonomy/self-
fulfillment rationale, arguing that speech cannot be delineated from
other types of activities that are open to government limitation.
156
Other theories have provided various rationales for protecting
speech. Blasi contended that the freedom of expression acts as a
check against "the abuse of power by public officials." ' 7 He does not
address, however, whether profanity would aid this checking capacity.
Emerson felt that free speech added to societal unity:
[The] process of open discussion promotes greater cohesion in a
society because people are more ready to accept decisions that go
against them if they have a part in the decision-making process...
• Freedom of expression thus provides a framework in which the
conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place
without destroying the society. It is an essential mechanism for
maintaining the balance between stability and change.11
8
However, given the ability of speech to inflame passions and
ignite action that can destroy the balance between stability and
change, free speech might play just as important a role in unsettling
society as it does in binding society together. Finally, Bollinger
contended that the real value of free speech came in its ability to
"shape the intellectual character of the society" toward tolerance. 9
In summary, then, neither the marketplace of ideas rationale nor
the self-governance rationale for free speech requires that profanity
be afforded constitutional protection in all cases. If profanity,
however, were included as part of a political message or true
expression of ideas then perhaps it would merit protection along with
the rest of the message. The self-fulfillment rationale for free speech
might justify protection of profanity in virtually any setting as long as
it satisfies the needs of the profane speaker. Even then, however,
155. Thomas Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 519,532-33 (1979).
156. Bork, supra note 148.
157. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521.527 (1977).
158. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
159. LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 107 (1986).
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some scholars might question whether protection of profanity as free
speech cheapens the constitutional notion of valued expression:
This country managed to live most of its years under rules,
conventional and legal, that forbade the public use of profanity ...
[and] it would be an abuse of language to say that its freedom was
thereby restricted in any important respect. Now, suddenly, and for
reasons that ought to persuade no one, we are told that it is a
violation of the First Amendment for the law to enforce these rules;
that however desirable it might be to see them preserved, there is
no way for the law to do this except by threatening the freedom of
all speech. [Do] we really live in a world so incapable of
communication that it can be said that "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric"?"6
IV. The FCC and Regulation of Profanity
A noteworthy phenomenon of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries in the United States was the emergence of regulatory
agencies. According to Horwitz, regulation developed as a response
to the economic turbulence of the late 1800s. '61 Regulatory structure
takes adjudicative power from the federal judiciary and legislative
authority from Congress; hence administrative agencies are quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative."' The acceptance of administrative law,
or regulation, in America has been tenuous at best. This may be
attributed in part to a mistrust of government and deference toward
the principle of separation of powers. Broadcast regulation poses a
unique dilemma.
The FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC),
was created during a time of significant political opposition to
expansion of administrative law. 63 The final bill was delayed in part
because of disagreement over the extent of social versus technical
limitations of the agency's authority. Proponents of social regulation,
such as Senator Clarence Dill, argued that too much focus on mere
technical issues would unnecessarily hamper the agency from the
160. WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 200 (1976).
161. ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE
DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1989).
162. Id.
163. 67 CONG. REC. 12,356-57 (1926); HORWITZ, supra note 161; HUGH R. SLOTTEN,
RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1920-1960 (2000).
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broader view of the "social and economic good of people . . .
Opponents of social regulation, such as Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover, wanted allocation authority restricted to narrow
technical parameters; judgments based on social factors carried the
implication of censorship.16 1 Ultimately, under the intolerable
spectrum situation created by the 1920s radio boom, the bill became
law as the Radio Act of 1927. Social considerations were included in
the agency's licensing authority under a vague mandate to regulate in
the "public interest, convenience or necessity. ' 66  The
Communications Act of 1934 further institutionalized the FRC as the
Federal Communication Commission. 167
Because of spectrum scarcity along with technical and fiscal
realities, only a relatively few traditionally have had access to
broadcast their voices. Common law notions of public interest allow
those few to operate their business in exchange for serving the
common good.' 6 Despite court challenges to the constitutionality of
the authority given to the FCC to, in essence, unilaterally make law,
the Supreme Court has upheld the standard as a "supple instrument
for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has
charged to carry out its legislative policy.'
' 69
The vagueness of the public interest standard also allows the
court its best opportunity to affect policy.17° This has led to some
controversy over what role the courts should play in actually making
communications policy. Schools of thought regarding the relationship
that the courts should have in policymaking range from judicial
restraint-conceding expert and statutory authority to the FCC-to
judicial activism. 7' The first sees the court's responsibility to judge
procedural issues or the agency's decision making process vis-A-vis
the decision itself. Another view is that the "the courts cannot, in the
communication area, avoid making policy. The reason is that the
standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity is so imprecise
that almost any interpretation of it-by the FCC or by a court-
164. 67 CONG. REC. 12,358 (1926)
165. SLOTTEN, supra note 163.
166. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1163 (1927).
167. Communication Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
168. E.G. KRASNOW, L.D. LONGLEY & H.A. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
REGULATION 17 (1982).
169. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
170. KRASNOW, supra note 168.
171. Id.
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makes policy." ' This dynamic policymaking process among the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government continues
to be particularly prominent and important in the ongoing debate
about broadcast profanity.
The third school of thought, espoused by the late U.S. Court of
Appeals Judge David Bazelon, views the courts as collaborators in
regulatory policymaking. Rather than merely nodding approval and
acquiescing to the "mysteries of administrative expertise," the
judiciary should take a more activist role. 73 He reasons that since
administrative litigation increasingly touches on social issues, strict
judicial scrutiny is required to ensure administrative neutrality by the
regulatory agencies.'74 This assumes, of course, strict neutrality on the
part of the courts themselves.
In the past, the Supreme Court has for the most part dismissed
the second view, instead deferring policymaking decisions to the
FCC. 75 The recent decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
once again raises various questions regarding FCC indecency
regulation. To what extent should courts act as a policymaking body?
Does the court's action violate the precedent of deferring
interpretation of the "public interest" to the FCC? To what extent is
preserved the original trustee notion of licensees receiving a
preferred status in return for fulfilling a public obligation? To what
extent can the FCC change its position with respect to new
developments or changing conditions?
A. Profanity as Indecency
Prior to Pacifica, FCC Hearing Examiner Sol Schildhause
assumed without serious doubt that "damn," "bastard" and other
unmentionables constituted "obscene, indecent or profane language"
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.176 In 1970 Philadelphia radio station
WUHY-FM broadcast an interview with Jerry Garcia of the Grateful
Dead in which Garcia uttered such profundities as "Any of that s-
either" and "Political change is so f-ing slow.' 77 The FCC concluded
172. Id. at 64.
173. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
174. Id. at 598.
175. FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 603-04 (1981); FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803, 814 (1978); KRASNOW, supra
note 168.
176. FCC Hearing Examiner, In the Matter of J. Botti, 3 F.C.C.2d 373, 377 (1965).
177. FCC, In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408,409 (1970).
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that "the speech involved has no redeeming social value" and that "it
conveys no thought to begin some speech with 'S-t, man. .. .,' or to
use 'f-g' as an adjective throughout the speech.. 78 As a result, "its
use can be avoided on radio without stifling in the slightest any
thought which the person wishes to convey.' 79 The Commission
concluded that the Garcia interview was not obscene because it did
not refer to sex, but the material was indecent because it was patently
offensive and lacked social value.'" Commissioners did not consider
whether the language might be profane.8 '
Following its adjudication in the Garcia case, the FCC continued
to apply the indecency, rather than profanity, rubric to broadcasts
involving four-letter words. In 1971, however, the Chief of the FCC's
Complaints and Compliance Division wrote to a complainant that the
FCC did not consider "damn" to be profanity." The FCC renewed a
Seattle station's license notwithstanding the fact it had broadcast "the
one word most likely to offend if heard over the air or anywhere else"
a single time in a "serious discussion of language usage"; the FCC
thus concluded that, in this context, "the four-letter Anglo-Saxon
verb denoting the act of sexual intercourse" was not indecent.8 3 A
Hearing Examiner suggested in that 1971 case that whether the word
might be indecent could not be categorically determined but would
depend on time and circumstance." Applying the standard in the
WUHY-FM case, the Commission determined that an Illinois radio
station's broadcast that "consisted of explicit exchanges in which
178. Id. at 410.
179. Id.
180. Id. The Commission relied heavily on the unwilling listener rationale, without
using that term, and the conclusion that the profanity was gratuitous or not necessary to
express the message being conveyed. See id.
181. See id.
182. FCC Chief of Complaints and Compliance Division, In re Complaint by Warren
B. Appleton, 28 F.C.C.2d 36, 37 (1971) (citing Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720
(9th Cir. 1966), in which the Ninth Circuit held that "G-damn it" was not profane within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464).
183. FCC Hearing Examiner, In Re Application of The Jack Straw Memorial
Foundation, 29 F.C.C.2d 334, 341 (1971).
184. Id. at 355. ("We can not avoid the difficult result that what particular language
may be unacceptable for broadcast is not susceptible to being reduced to an immutable,
time resistant glossary."). The Hearing Examiner also held forth at length on then-
President Richard Nixon's views about the profane film "Love Story," based on Erich
Segal's book. President Nixon was said to have been "mildly upset at the film's profanity";
the noted swearer-in-chief also gave some advice: "Mr. Nixon said that swearing 'has its
place, but if it is used it should be used to punctuate.' If profanity is overused, he said,
'what you remember is the profanity and not the point."' Id. (citation omitted).
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female callers spoke of their oral sex experiences" was indecent. '85 On
a petition for reconsideration, however, the FCC clarified that so-
called "topless radio," or sex-talk shows, were not necessarily
forbidden: "We are emphatically not saying that sex per se is a
forbidden subject on the broadcast medium. We are well aware that
sex is a vital human relationship which has concerned humanity over
the centuries and that sex and obscenity are not the same thing."'"
The Commission later noted that the Sonderling case was
significant because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in affirming the FCC's indecency conclusion,"
approved for the first time the idea that "the probable presence of
children in the radio audience is relevant to a determination of
obscenity."' 8 The Commission expressed reservations, however, that
the then-existing version of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was too narrow in that it
spoke of "language" and thus might not authorize regulation of
indecent or obscene images.'89 The FCC's response to the Carlin
monologue hinged, of course, largely on the likelihood (and, as it
turned out, reality) of children hearing the profane broadcast at 2
p.m. on October 30, 1973 on New York City station WBAI-FM.'9 The
Commission first noted that the WBAI broadcast did not implicate
obscene speech, which the Commission said it had found in the
discussion of oral sex in the Sonderling case; given the Supreme
Court's then-recent definition of obscenity in Miller v. California,'91
the Commission readily acknowledged that Carlin's profane
monologue did not constitute obscenity.
9 2
185. FCC, In re Apparent Liability of Station WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973).
The station was operated by Sonderling Broadcast Corp. in Oak Park, Illinois. Id.
186. FCC, In the Matter of Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 783
(1973).
187. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 405 (D.C. Cir.
1975), as amended.
188. FCC, Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51
F.C.C.2d 418, 425 (1975) ("The new definition of 'indecent' is tied to the use of language
that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for broadcast media, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.").
189. Id. at 424.
190. FCC, In the Matter of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station
WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975).
191. 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
192. FCC, In the Matter of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station
WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 96 (1975).
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As is well known, the Commission also articulated the
characteristics of broadcasting that allowed differential constitutional
treatment when compared to other communications media:
(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are
unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a
place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference
* . .; (3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any
warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and
(4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the
government must therefore license in the public interest. Of special
concern to the Commission as well as parents is the first point
regarding the use of radio by children. 93
The Commission largely focused on a "parental interest" in
protecting children from exposure to profane language. Thus, the
Commission distinguished indecency from obscenity by saying that
description of sex or excretion may be indecent, when children are
present, even if the material does not appeal to prurient interest and
even if the material possesses scientific, literary, artistic, or political
value.'9 The commissioners discussed the privacy interest that arises
in one's own home. 196 Hence the FCC admonished broadcasters that,
if they choose to convey indecent material when children are not
likely to be present-as they may legally do-they "must make
substantial and solid efforts to warn unconsenting adults who do not
want the type of language broadcast in this case thrust into the
sanctuary of their home."'" This has typically been thought of as the
"unwilling listener" problem, 98 but in reality it has more to do with
privacy-"the right to be let alone."199
Subsequent to Pacifica, the FCC's approach to regulating
profanity under the indecency rubric changed little for more than 20
193. Id. at 97.
194. Id. at 98.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22) (majority opinion of Harlan, J.)
("government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of
the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot totally be barred from the public
dialogue")).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(calling this "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men"). For elaboration on the right to privacy in the context of profane broadcasting, see
infra notes 265-281 and accompanying text.
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years."° Perhaps the most significant change in the 1980s was that the
Commission explicitly disclaimed the need for references to sex or
excretion to be repeated; in other words, such material referenced
just once, in certain contexts, could be considered indecent."' A major
dispute in the 1990s concerned the "safe harbor" in which the FCC
would allow broadcasters to air indecent material; after several
administrative and judicial looks at the issue, the FCC in 2001
solidified the parameters of the safe harbor as between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. 202 At the same time the FCC issued a Policy Statement detailing,
for the benefit of broadcasters, the agency's definition of and
approach to regulating broadcast indecency.0 3 The Policy Statement
explained that the FCC would treat as indecent any material that
explicitly depicts or describes sex or excretion in a way patently
offensive to the contemporary community standard, particularly
where the material is dwelt upon and appears aimed to pander,
titillate, and shock viewers or listeners.2 ' The Policy Statement
explicitly did not address profane language,25 but the Statement did
emphasize that the FCC would consider, among other factors,
200. Comparing the FCC adjudications from the late 1970s with those of the late
1990s, it is clear that the applicable legal standard for indecency had not changed. The
FCC also indicated in these adjudications that a single profanity would not likely rise to
the level of indecency. See, e.g., FCC, In re Notice to Trustees of the University of
Pennsylvania, 57 F.C.C.2d 782, 790 (1975) (finding, under the then-applicable standard of
the WUHY and Sonderling adjudications, that a university radio station had broadcast
indecent material in a segment called the Vegetable Report that included an in-studio
announcer asking a three-year-old boy whose mother had called the show, "Johnny, can
you say 'f-'?"); FCC, In re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d
1250, 1254 (1978) (expressing skepticism, in light of the Supreme Court's then-recent
opinion in Pacifica, that a single profanity could be considered indecent); FCC
Enforcement Bureau, In the Matter of WLDI, Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 3011, 3012-13 (2001) (on-
air discussion of sex was indecent under standard adopted in FCC's Pacifica order); FCC,
In the Matter of Citicasters Co., 16 F.C.C.R. 7546, 7547 (2001) (graphic on-air discussion
of masturbation and various forms of sex was indecent, but the Commission did not
consider whether it was profanity).
201. FCC, In the Matter of Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987).
202. FCC, In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency,
16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8001 (2001).
203. Id. See also Federal Communications Commission, Notice, Industry Guidance on
the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1464 and Enforcement Policies
Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 66 FR 21984 (May 2, 2001) (codified in the FCC's rules at
section 73.3999).
204. Id.
205. See In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency,
16 F.C.C.R. 7999 n.1 (FCC 2001).
whether the material was repetitive.2 6 Thus it appeared at that point
that the FCC would not attempt to regulate fleeting expletives, and
indeed "Bono himself reportedly used the 'F-Word' on the 1994
Grammy Awards broadcast" with no apparent FCC action.2"
On October 3, 2003, the FCC responded to the 2003 Bono
incident through an adjudicative order issued by David H. Solomon,
chief of the Enforcement Bureau. 8 Solomon wrote that Bono's
fleeting expletive did not fall under the FCC's enforcement
mechanism because Bono did not describe sexual or excretory
activities or organs2°9 and because the FCC previously had declined to
punish one-time profanity. 20 But the full Commission disagreed and
held that Bono's fleeting expletive was "shocking and gratuitous" and
had no political meaning; thus the Commission concluded that NBC
and other broadcast licensees could be held responsible to take
advantage of technological advances-such as time delay-that would
enable editing of profanity before public broadcast. "  The
commissioners reasoned that "any use of that word or a variation, in
any context, inherently has a sexual connotation"; that "[i]ts use
invariably invokes a coarse sexual image" and is therefore patently
offensive; and that any prior agency interpretation declining to act on
fleeting expletives "is no longer good law.,
212
206. Id. at 8003 ("The principal factors that have proved significant in our decisions to
date are: (1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual or
excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears to
pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its
shock value.") (emphasis in original).
207. FCC, In the Matter of Various Complaints Against Broadcast Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4979
n.29 (March 18, 2004) (citing http://zooeuropa.com/quotes/bono.html).
208. FCC Enforcement Bureau, In the Matter of Various Complaints Against
Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 18
F.C.C.R. 19859 (Oct. 3, 2003).
209. Id. at 19861 ("The word 'f-ing' may be crude and offensive, but, in the context
presented here, did not describe sexual or excretory organs or activities. Rather, the
performer used the word 'f-ing' as an adjective or expletive to emphasize an
exclamation.").
210. Id. (citation omitted).
211. FCC, In the Matter of Various Complaints Against Broadcast Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978-
80 (March 18, 2004).
212. Id.
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B. Profanity as Profanity
However, in its 2004 order in the Bono case, the FCC did not
stop with its indecency analysis. Instead, the Commission also held
that Bono's fleeting expletive was punishable as profanity under 18
U.S.C. § 1464 .3 Although acknowledging its adjudication history
provided little background on which to define impermissible
profanity, 4 the Commission nonetheless stated that it would begin to
regulate, as profanity, "the 'F-Word' and those words (or variants
thereof) that are as highly offensive as the 'F-Word .. 21 Not
limiting its profanity definition to blasphemy, the FCC pointed to a
1972 Seventh Circuit opinion216 upholding a conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and defining profanity as "those personally reviling
epithets naturally tending to provoke violent resentment or denoting
language which under contemporary community standards is so
grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to
amount to a nuisance. '' 21 7 The FCC in 2006 held that the broadcasts
involving profanity by Cher and Richie also were both indecent and
profane under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.28 Although the Second Circuit in
2007 reversed the 2004 and 2006 FCC orders, 9 the basis for that
reversal was the Administrative Procedure Act and hence the court
never reached the question of whether the FCC could regulate non-
obscene, non-indecent profanity as a public nuisance or privacy
invasion of the home.
The FCC's parting shot in its 2004 Bono order was that networks
could avoid liability for unscripted profanity on live television by
implementing a technological solution-a "delay/bleeping system.
20
As of spring 2008, after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari and
merits briefs deadlines had been set in the appeal, the networks all
213. Id.
214. The Commission cited Black's Law Dictionary in defining profanity as "vulgar,
irreverent, or coarse language." Id. at 4981.
215. Id.
216. Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
217. Id. at 286.
218. FCC, In the Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006).
219. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 449 (2d Cir. 2007).
220. FCC, In the Matter of Various Complaints Against Broadcast Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982
(March 18, 2004).
had some type of system in place.22 ' Frank Ahrens, the Washington
Post reporter, provided a "rare glimpse" into the "closely guarded"
process employed by one network to thwart fleeting expletives on live
TV:
Currently, another network has four employees in four separate
booths watching programming as it airs, their fingers literally
hovering over two delay, or "dump," buttons, one for video, one for
audio.
The network also has a fifth staffer who maintains an open
phone line to two executives at the live event as it airs. The
employees in the booths must undergo periodic "button training,"
during which they are shown mock broadcasts to test their reaction
time and judgment.
During an actual broadcast, if any one of the staffers hears or
sees something they feel could prompt an FCC fine and pushes
their button, the show's audio will be dropped for as many seconds
as necessary and the video shot will be switched away from the
22offending party, to thwart lip-readers.
Ahrens quoted network executives who said that, if allowed to
continue, fines for fleeting expletives on live TV will essentially mean
the end of live television.223 Although network critics, including
Parents Television Council President Tim Winter and FCC Chairman
Kevin J. Martin, charged the networks with trying to use the fleeting
expletive issue as a first step to undermine all regulation of indecency
and obscenity,224 the networks contended that the protection from
fines for fleeting expletives was merely a stopgap for infrequent
errors. "A positive ruling from the court would simply acknowledge
that no system is perfect and must allow for a small margin of human
error," a Fox representative, Scott Grogin, told the newspaper.2 5 But
Winter, a former broadcast TV executive, noted recent instances of
profanity and argued that fleeting expletives are substantially
increasing in number in recent years: "Recently, NBC aired the
unedited four-letter 'C-word' for female genitalia spoken by Jane
Fonda during an interview on the Today show. Actress Diane Keaton
221. See Frank Ahrens, TV Decency Showdown Heads to Supreme Court, ST. PAUL
PIONEER-PRESS, April 13, 2008, at A8.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Investor's Business Daily speculated that this was the aim of Rupert Murdoch,
whose News Corp. media empire includes Fox. See Unsigned Editorial, Foxy Malady,
INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, April 2,2008.
225. Id.
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used the 'F-word' during her interview on ABC Good Morning
America.
226
The arguments against the FCC's recent position on broadcast
profanity include the notion that self-censorship will occur because
the networks will not want to come close to violating the standard.227
The risk of self-censorship, or a chilling effect, certainly poses First
Amendment concerns because the quantity and quality of speech
available in the marketplace of ideas could be reduced. In fact, none
of the First Amendment values-search for truth, self-governance,
self-expression, check on government, tolerance22 8-is generally
served by silence. But the self-censorship argument assumes that
network executives and other network employees are not smart
enough to figure out the difference between, for example, profanity in
the World War II films "Saving Private Ryan" and "Schindler's List,"
on the one hand, and profanity in radio talk shows with personalities
such as Bubba the Love Sponge and Howard Stern, on the other
hand.9 Another common argument is that profanity is simply too
prevalent in society for regulating it on television to make any
difference, but it already has been established that the government
disallows profanity in various circumstances, including schools,
courtrooms, debt collection efforts, prisons, airports, public buses or
subways, and the workplace."
V. Profanity and Privacy In The Home
A review of U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests there is
ample basis for the conclusion that broadcast profanity may-should
the relevant and empowered legislative and administrative actors
choose to do so-be regulated as a nuisance or an invasion of privacy.
For example, in Cohen the Court suggested that unwanted profanity
in the sanctuary of the home could-and perhaps even should-be
treated differently than profanity in a public setting."' Although the
226. Winter, supra note 9.
227. Calvert, supra note 97, at 64-65, 83.
228. See supra notes 138-160 and accompanying text.
229. FCC, In the Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13310 (2006) ("Saving
Private Ryan" not indecent); FCC, In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the
Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies
Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) ("Schindler's List" was not
indecent but Stern and Bubba the Love Sponge broadcasts were indecent).
230. See supra notes 97-137 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Court rejected the argument that Cohen's profane jacket in the
courthouse hallway was constitutionally unprotected because it
subjected unwilling viewers to words they preferred to avoid, the
Court nonetheless appeared to approve the idea that an unwilling
listener in his or her own home would have a much stronger claim.232
Further, the Cohen Court said that loud and public profanity could be
regulated where it was in the hearing of women and children. With
regard to children, then, it might be reasonable to conclude that
broadcast television profanity, like indecency, can be regulated within
certain hours (such as 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.) when children are likely to be
watching and listening.233
Cohen's use of profanity differed greatly from the uses of Bono,
Cher and Nicole Richie of the same vulgar four-letter word. While
Cohen expressed a particular political message that would not have
been as effective without the word, none of the three celebrities in
question came anywhere near the level of Cohen's political feeling
and expressiveness. Bono and Richie merely used a four-letter word
as an adjective outside the political context to describe their own
accolades and activities, and the behavioral idiosyncrasies of
celebrities pale in comparison to the high-value speech generally at
the heart of the marketplace of ideas and self-governance rationales
for free expression. Cher, meanwhile, used the same word merely as
an epithet. Although not directed at particular individuals and thus
not fighting words or incitement, the word used by Cher came in the
mode of a personal attack and not a political message at all. The
Cohen Court's words about protecting even profanity as part of a
political message in order to advance self-government23 " do not seem
applicable to gratuitous celebrity uses of profanity on prime-time
television.
As in Cohen, the Supreme Court's opinion in Hess provides
grounding for the regulation of broadcast profanity notwithstanding
the First Amendment. While the Hess opinion states that a university
student's muttering of a four-letter word under his breath on a public
street during a demonstration on a university campus did not invade
substantial privacy interests,2 the calculus could be different when
the same word is said on national, prime-time television being
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 202 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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broadcast into millions of homes with children present and listening.
The latter resembles intrusion upon the seclusion, or trespass, of
viewers in their homes; the constitutional difference between the use
of the word by Hess and Bono, for example, is clear when one
considers the Court's distinction in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville
between the home, on the one hand, and, on the other, the environs
of a drive-in theater visible from a public street. 36
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in Pacifica specifically held that
certain speech in the wrong setting can become like a pig in the
parlor.237 The Pacifica Court further concluded that the "unique
pervasiveness" of broadcasting may "invade" the home, and
therefore some government regulation is necessary to protect the
substantial privacy interest of personal enjoyment and peace in one's
own home. Under Pacifica, though, the nuisance rationale may be
applied to broadcast profanity only when it is repetitive and rises to
the level of indecency. That holding does not foreclose the regulation
of broadcast profanity under a mere profanity (i.e., non-indecent)
rationale, however. Instead, the common law of nuisance may apply
to even non-obscene and non-indecent broadcast profanity if it
substantially interferes with the public interest.
The extensive common-law jurisprudence of nuisance indicates
that profanity becomes a public nuisance when it causes disturbance
or injury to listeners;2" inconveniences or disturbs the whole
community; 39 "very gravely influence[s] the good order or enjoyment
or convenience of the citizens";240 and is "hurtful and offensive to the
community. 2 41 Clearly, not every profane utterance on broadcast TV
would justify a finding of public nuisance, but the overall
repetitiveness of profanity on television generally might be called a
nuisance. Even in contemporary times, courts have applied the
common law of nuisance to regulate public profanity outside the
broadcast context, and this is particularly so when the profanity
invades or affects the home.242 The remainder of this section will
236. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 418, 425 (Dauphin Co. Ct.
Comm. Pleas 1978) (public nuisance was established when a group of teenagers threw
rocks and trash, spit, played loud music and uttered profanities to the disturbance of
nearby homes); Green v. State, 56 So.2d 12 (Miss. 1952) (public nuisance existed when a
further explore the right one might be said to have, within the walls of
his or her own home, to be free from profanity that invades privacy.
This will be accomplished by first examining the captive audience
doctrine and then exploring the application of Justice Brandeis' "right
to be let alone, 243 in the broadcast profanity context.
A. Captive Audience
The captive audience doctrine brings another dimension to the
discussion of whether or not the FCC can regulate profanity. Eugene
Volokh argued that the captive audience doctrine is really two
doctrines as the doctrine differs based on whether the speech in
question occurs outside or inside the recognized private sanctuary of
the home; he posits that, in the few instances the Court has sustained
restrictions based on content in order to protect captive audiences,
those audiences have been in the home." Besides Pacifica,245 where
the Court determined that "the home ... [is] a place where people's
privacy interest is entitled to extra deference, 246 and "in the privacy
of the home . . . the individual's rights to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment right of an intruder,, 24 7 several other
cases-most notably Frisby v. Schulz 248 and Rowan v. U.S. Post
Office-have built up the notion of a captive audience in the home
having rights protecting them from unwanted, invasive speech.249
In Frisby the Court upheld a law restricting picketing outside a
specific home by contending that those in the home were "captive,
250
"with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech., 25' Thus the
Court held that the rights of those in the home who desired to avoid
caf6 played loud music and encouraged drunken and profane customers in disturbances of
nearby homes).
243. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
244. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1832-33 (1992).
245. Even in dissent, Justice Powell conceded in Pacifica that "broadcasting-unlike
most other forms of communication-comes directly into the home, the one place where
people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and
sounds .... Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the
first blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in public before they turn away
... a different order of values obtains in the home." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 759.
246. Id. at 731 n.2.
247. Id. at 748.
248. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
249. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
250. 487 U.S. at 484.
251. Id. at 487.
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the intrusive, undesired speech outweighed the free speech rights of
the picketers, declaring that "there is simply no right to force speech
into the home of an unwilling listener." '252 Similarly, the Court's 1970
decision in Rowan, upholding a law requiring mass mailing companies
to remove addressees from their list when so requested, found that
"even 'good' ideas" did not merit sufficient constitutional protection
to allow someone "to send unwanted material into the home of
another ... . That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech and other sounds does not
mean we must be captives everywhere.,
253
Other cases have made minor but still important contributions to
the captive audience doctrine and the notion of home privacy rights
against unwanted speech.254 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that harassing telephone calls constituted an invasion of
privacy and stated that the state had "a compelling interest in the
protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance" in
their own homes.255 Also, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism that government has a right "to avoid
undue [noise] intrusion into residential areas" in its ruling that New
York City was justified in cutting off electricity to a concert in Central
Park when the concert repeatedly ignored demands to lower their
volume after complaints by nearby residents.256 While not dealing with
a residential setting, the Supreme Court recognized in Bethel v. Fraser
the right "of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to
protect children-especially in a captive audience-from exposure to
sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." '257
Bethel indirectly introduces the home-parent-child nexus behind
much of the captive audience doctrine as it applies to a residential
setting. The pervasive nature of the television presents difficulty for
parents in adequately supervising their children's watching habits.5
252. Id.
253. 397 U.S. at 738.
254. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Vittitow v. City of
Upper Arlington, 43 F. 3d 1100 (1995); Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 48 U.S. 901 (1972); Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
255. Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Department of Probation, 632 F. 2d 938,
941 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d. Cir. 1978)).
256. Ward et al. v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989).
257. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
258. J.M. Balkin, Comment, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of
Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1138 (1996).
This leads to a situation where parents suffer significant cultural
pressures to have a television set and keep it in one's home. Once
television is in the home, it is difficult to protect unwilling listeners
from encountering programs they don't want to watch other than by
keeping the television turned off at all times. The captive audience
doctrine, it is said, has special force in the home because expectations
of privacy are higher there.59
While such an argument might not be valid if applied only to
adults, scholars and justices have contended that children constitute a
uniquely captive audience. In his concurrence in Ginsberg v. New
York, Justice Stewart declared that "the Constitution guarantees, in
short, a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity
of its members to choose. '2W He went on to assert that "a child-like
someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity
for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees."26 ' Hence, Araiza posits that "not only are children more
'captive' than adults in the sense of not being as able to choose to
receive or reject certain speech, but they may also be harmed more by
unwanted speech that is in fact received., 262 Araiza notes the
constitutional stature that parental authority receives, and given that
the home is the domain for such authority, the government has often
been justified in helping parents limit children's access to undesirable
materials or experiences. Thus, Marcy Strauss's trio of "specific
interests [that] underlie the right to be let alone in the captive
audience context: the right to make individual choices (autonomy);
the right to repose; and the right to be free from offense, ' 2  appear to
apply even more to children than to adults.
B. "Right to Be Let Alone"
The FCC in 1987 explicitly disclaimed the scarcity rationale as a
basis for regulating indecency so the remaining justifications asserted
in the 1975 Pacifica FCC order are effect on children, forced exposure
259. Id. at 1137.
260. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
261. Id. at 649-50.
262. William D. Araiza, Captive Audiences, Children and the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 397, 409 (2003).
263. Id.
264. Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q., 85, 108 (1991).
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to unwilling listeners and the privacy of the home.265 Although not
discounting the impact of broadcast profanity on children,2" this
section focuses on the home privacy interest. In reality, the impact on
children and the home privacy interest are closely connected, and the
privacy issue is virtually all-inclusive because it also implicates the
interests of unwilling adult listeners with no children at home. The
Supreme Court has recognized protecting the privacy of the home as
267a compelling government interest. As has been noted, the Supreme
Court has given special consideration to the impact of broadcast
indecency on the privacy of the home.26
Dissenting in Pacifica, Justice William Brennan contended that
the "right to be let alone" within the walls of one's home was not
implicated by broadcast profanity because anyone who chooses to
turn on a television or radio is really choosing to participate in public
discourse.269 This statement was made as part of the well-worn
argument, eloquently advanced here by Justice Brennan, that viewers
may simply turn off the television when confronted with something
they do not want to see or hear.27" For whatever merits that argument
might have had in 1978, its effectiveness is largely lost in an age when
Americans are accustomed to constantly growing rights of privacy
and personal choice that allow them to legally edit profanity on DVD
copies of Hollywood films, 27' elect not to have certain material mailed
265. FCC, In the Matter of Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987)
("[W]e no longer consider the argument of spectrum scarcity to provide a sufficient basis
for this type of regulation.").
266. For more on the government interest in protecting children from profanity, see
Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting Children
From Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427 (2000).
267. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("The State's interest in protecting
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a
free and civilized society.").
268. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
269. 438 U.S. at 765-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the minimal discomfort
suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during the
brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch stations or flick the "off"
button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the
right of those interested to receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment
protection.").
270. Id.
271. See Joel M. Purles, Note, Balancing the Scales: Expanding the Family Movie Act
to Protect Consumers After Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 351, 367 (2008) (reviewing the Family Movie Act of 2005, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 110,
which amended the Copyright Act to allow use of technology that mutes profanity).
to their homes via the U.S. Postal Service,272 place their telephone
numbers on a national "Do Not Call" list,"3 and protect their
financial, medical, educational, and even videotape rental information
from disclosure.74
The argument that unwilling listeners in their homes can take
action every time they do not want to be further exposed to broadcast
profanity they already have been forced to hear is simply outdated
and out of step with movement in the rest of the law. Scholars have
noted that the entire U.S. legal system has moved from one in which
property was the paradigmatic right to one in which privacy looms
large. In reality, however, the right to privacy might be a misnomer.
Jeremy M. Miller has argued that the right to privacy really should be
called the right to dignity; the right to dignity, in turn, hinges on
individual choice. 6 Thus, in the context of broadcast profanity, the
dominant constitutional principle at work is not free expression, as
the Supreme Court cases clearly have held that profanity in and of
itself has little or no value and is not protected except in the case of
certain political messages expressed in public. 7 Instead, the key
constitutional principle involves privacy, dignity and choice: "No one
has the right to force an individual to accept what they are entitled to
exclude, including what they must listen to. If a person cannot assert
his or her authority at home, that person loses a part of his or her
sense of dignity." '278 When it interferes with the quiet enjoyment of
272. See Rowan, 387 U.S. at 738.
273. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (Mar. 11,
2003), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.
274. 12 U.S.C. §3401 et seq.; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 210 et seq.)
(establishing protection from public access for individual medical care and payment
information); 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g); 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
275. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 20, 57 (1990).
276. Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity As A New Framework, Replacing the Right to Privacy,
30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2007) ("[T]he Court is not protecting privacy in any
sense, but dignity. Certainly, one's power to make personal decisions, at the least, affects
one's sense of self-worth and respect and the respect received from others. Thus, the
ability to exercise those rights undeniably influences the growth of individuals and in turn,
society .... The strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and the
independence of our people. Our confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the
wisest choice.").
277. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
278. Miller, supra note 276, at 33.
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one's own home, broadcast profanity may become a private
nuisance.2 79
The roots of a right to privacy, or dignity, have always centered
on protection of individuals' right to make decisions for themselves in
their own homes. In their seminal privacy article, Warren and
Brandeis stated that "the right to be let alone" was paramount in
one's own home: "The common law has always recognized a man's
house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers
engaged in the execution of its commands."2'8 Possibly what most
upsets those who complain about broadcast profanity is simply the
lack of choice within their own homes. 8 ' Although the V-chip, TV
ratings and so-called "family hour" have purported to give television
consumers control over the content they receive, the reality is those
attempted solutions largely have not been sufficient.28 Real choice
might look something like multiple broadcast feeds from each
network, enabling consumers to select the level of profanity-if any-
they want delivered to their homes. Such a system would protect any
vestigial constitutional right of the sender while also preserving the
right of access for those who do wish to receive the material.2 83 Unless
279. See Milling v. Berg, 104 So.2d 658 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958); Point Service Corp. v.
Myers, 125 P.3d 1107 (Mont. 2005).
280. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 220 (1890).
281. The "right to be let alone," to the extent it has been actually applied, has often
acted to prevent government intrusion into an individual's expectation of privacy. See, e.g.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of marital privacy includes
contraceptive use); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional, on
individual privacy grounds, a Massachusetts law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to
consumers who were not married); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy
included some abortions). See also GLENDON, supra note 275, at 57 ("Eisenstadt...
marked the elevation to constitutional status of an individual's right to be let alone ...... ).
However, scholars and jurists have noted that, in today's world, the need to be protected
from privacy invasion extends at least as much to large corporate interests-such as
hegemonic broadcast networks operating under government licensing on the public
airwaves-as it does to government. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (discussing video surveillance, among other things,
by large non-government institutions). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536
(2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the right to be let alone by the news media).
282. See, e.g., Genelle I. Belmas, Gail D. Love & Brian C. Foy, A Consumer
Perspective on FCC Broadcast Indecency Denials, 60 FED. COMM. L. J. 67, 97-98 (2007)
("It has been suggested that children's television rules, FCC indecency regulations, and
the V-Chip have all had limited utility in protecting children .... ) (internal citations
omitted).
283. While the creation of such a system obviously would present its own set of
challenges, it is clear that it would be preferable for the broadcast industry and the
government if it were voluntary rather than compelled through legislation or regulation.
and until something like that happens, the unwilling listener and
those concerned about their children will continue to object to the
increasingly profane broadcast content to which they are subjected in
their own homes.
VI. Conclusion
While constitutional precedent, combined with the common law
of nuisance or the law of privacy, would seem to allow sanctions of
broadcast profanity in some situations, this does not mean every
utterance of a four-letter word on broadcast television must subject
broadcasters to large fines. For example, in the context of meaningful
political discussion or public affairs reporting, broadcasters whose
interviewees speak profanities should not be responsible for nuisance
or invasion of privacy. 28 On the other hand, broadcasters who-with
the technological ability to prevent it-appear to sanction and abet
gratuitous profanity on celebrity awards shows or raunchy talk shows,
for example, may ultimately be causing or contributing to a nuisance
or privacy invasion that would justify regulation.
The FCC, however, might do well to even more completely shift
its focus from treating profanity as indecency to instead treating
profanity as profanity. This approach was envisioned by Congress in
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and would likely prove more straightforward and
precise than attempting to shoehorn profanity cases into the
indecency rubric. Profanity that does not describe sexual activity or
excretory organs does not square with the definition of indecency
even though it might be considered disturbing, offensive, substantially
inconvenient and hurtful, but such profanity may well constitute a
nuisance because it substantially interferes with privacy interests.
Broadcasters, scholars and others might argue there is no precise
definition of profanity-as-nuisance or profanity-as-privacy-invasion.
Thus far, the FCC has only defined profanity as "the 'F-Word' and
those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive as the
'F-Word [],,,5 This definition obviously would have to be made more
precise so that broadcasters have notice of what is prohibited.
This is so for prudential reasons as much as legal and constitutional reasons; while the
constitutionality would have to be examined, the Supreme Court has approved compelled
broadcast speech in another context. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(fairness doctrine).
284. As has been noted, drawing such lines can be admittedly difficult. See supra note
149 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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Constitutionally sufficient guidance could be achieved through FCC
rulemaking and adjudication as well as observance of developing
federal court jurisprudence."6
If facilitating individual self-fulfillment and autonomy is the true
and only goal of the First Amendment's speech protection, then
broadcast profanity likely should not and cannot be regulated without
violating the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the meaning of the
First Amendment extends primarily to protecting political and other
high-value speech that leads to truth and democratic decision-making,
then profanity with nothing more remains at the margins of the First
Amendment and may-under certain circumstances-be regulated at
least as to its time, place, and manner. The answer to the question
raised by broadcast profanity is far from obvious, and well-meaning
individuals can disagree as to the proper outcome of the ongoing
debate over the issue.
This manuscript's attempt has been not to establish who is right
or wrong in specific instances, nor has it attempted to determine what
course of action is socially or morally desirable with respect to
broadcast profanity. Instead the manuscript has explored, first,
whether constitutional barriers exist to regulation of broadcast
profanity and, second, whether there is sufficient basis in the law of
nuisance and privacy to justify such regulation should the government
choose to engage in it. The study of relevant Supreme Court
precedents demonstrates that the Court's protection of speech within
the ambit of the First Amendment does not dictate that profanity
may not be regulated by the FCC. In fact, even speech-protective
opinions such as Cohen and Hess have made a distinction between a
single public profanity protected by the First Amendment and
unwanted profanity in one's own home that would not be
constitutionally shielded from regulation. Combined with the
common law of nuisance and the law of privacy, this jurisprudence
seems to indicate that the FCC could, without offending the
Constitution, directly regulate profanity as one of the objects of
Congressional intent in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
286. See Tallman, 465 F.2d at 286 (defining profanity as "those personally reviling
epithets naturally tending to provoke violent resentment or denoting language which
under contemporary community standards is so grossly offensive to members of the public
who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance."). This definition, too, remains admittedly
vague and will need refining by legislators, regulators and jurists.
